Description
Date depot: 1 janvier 1900
Titre: Unification de l'Argumentation et de la Théorie des Jeux pour la Négociation Automatisée
Directeur de thèse:
Pavlos MORAITIS (LIPADE)
Domaine scientifique: Sciences et technologies de l'information et de la communication
Thématique CNRS : Non defini
Resumé:
Negotiation is the process to reach an agreement about some matters between two or several agents. In game theoretic negotiation, the negotiation is seen as a game. A game is applied to every situation in which the participants interact to find a solution. Argumentation-based negotiation is done by exchanging arguments between the participant agents. There is a lot of work in game-theoretic negotiation that deals with all the aspects of negotiation. On the other hand, the research in argumentation-based negotiation has focused mainly on the protocols to regulate the negotiation and reasoning mechanisms to generate and order offers, however the study of strategic issues that define the behavior of an agent during the negotiation has been largely neglected. Moreover, the deadline constraint on the negotiation process, has also not been taken into account.
This thesis tries to fill this gap by working in three directions. Firstly, a framework for argumentation-based negotiation is proposed which is based on some concepts studied in game-theoretic negotiation. The framewok permits to set in order the different offers following the supporting arguments and to negotiate by using an adaptation of the well known Alternating Offers Protocol propounded in game theory. For this protocol a generic strategy which can be used with any form of preference relationship over the set of offers and with any form of concession is given. Secondly, this thesis proposes some tactics for time constrained argumentation-based negotiation. The tactics are based on the information that an agent possess about his opponent agent. This information is gathered during the negotiation dialogue or is obtained by knowing the role of the opponent agent. Finally, an experimental evaluation is presented that shows how tactics and concessions may influence the negotiation length and outcome, under the assumptions of time constraints and the availability of information on the opponent.
Doctorant.e: Hadidi Nabila