Description
Date depot: 1 octobre 2020
Titre: Secure and Verified Cryptographic Implementations in the Random Probing Model
Directeur de thèse:
Damien VERGNAUD (LIP6)
Domaine scientifique: Sciences et technologies de l'information et de la communication
Thématique CNRS : Non defini
Resumé:
In cryptography, a side-channel attack is any attack based on information gained from the implementation of a cryptosystem, rather than weaknesses in the implemented algorithm itself. After two decades of research, these attacks have become more and more powerful and cryptographic implementations with provable and verifiable security against those attacks are more than ever required. To reason about the security of masked implementations, the community introduced leakage models among which the random probing model which enjoys both practical relevance and theoretical convenience to design and prove secure implementations. However only very few constructions have been proposed in this model which are still inefficient for practical applications. The main objective of this thesis is to fill this gap and more precisely (1) to build new practical constructions with provable security in the random probing model, (2) to construct new or improve existing verification tools to assess the random probing security of cryptographic implementations, (3) to conceive and demonstrate cryptographic libraries achieving quantified levels of security in the random probing model and finally (4) to go beyond the random probing model by enriching it with several features to better capture the reality of embedded devices.
Doctorant.e: Taleb Abdul Rahman